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Hobbes’s Natural Condition and His Natural Science    
 
Very early in Leviathan, before the end of chapter two (2.8), Thomas Hobbes says that 
there are political consequences of his explanation of perception, thought, memory, and 
dreams—an explanation that is squarely in the province of natural science (chs. 1-3).1 
 Once he completes that explanation, however, he does not go on to spell out any further 
connections between his natural science and his political science.  In this paper I argue 
that the “natural condition of mankind” Hobbes describes in Leviathan, which is the 
problem that his political science is intended to solve, can in fact be understood only with 
reference to his materialistic or mechanistic explanation of perception and thought.   I do 
so assuming that I can discuss the meaning and intention of Leviathan without referring 
to Hobbes’s other works. 
 
The first question to ask about Hobbes’ natural condition is “What is it?”, and the 
obvious answer to begin with is that the natural condition is a condition of war.  Hobbes 
specifies that by “war” he means not actual fighting but “the known disposition thereto 
during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary” (13.8).  For the sake of brevity I 
merely assert the following rather than argue it.  The natural condition, according to 
Hobbes, is a condition of war, but not at all necessarily a war in which there is any actual 
fighting, certainly not necessarily actual fighting of “every man against every man,” and 
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by no means necessarily a war in which most people are miserable, with “nasty, brutish, 
and short” lives.   
 
This peculiar notion of the natural condition of war, Hobbes says in Leviathan’s famous 
chapter thirteen, is an “inference made from the passions” (13.10).  Oddly, Hobbes does 
not name the passions he has in mind, but he ties them closely to what he calls the “three 
principal causes of quarrel” “in the nature of man”: “competition, diffidence, and glory” 
(13.6).  At first glance it appears that what Hobbes means is that the natural passions of 
man lead him to want to surpass others, lead him to be inclined to dominate as many 
others as possible, and lead him to seek deference, admiration, and recognition of his 
superiority.  In other words, it looks as though the passions of man lead him, in general, 
to pursue power over others, and that it is the character of the passions that makes human 
existence a war of every man against every man.  (Since one does not always act on one’s 
passions, the state of war need not be a condition of actual conflict.)  When Hobbes says 
war is a state in which nothing prevents conflict when there is a known disposition to it 
(13.8), it looks as though he means by the latter part (the known disposition), passions of 
the sort I have just described. 
 
That would be consistent with Hobbes’s general reputation and with the apparent 
meaning of some of his most famous words, such as, “in the first place I put for a general 
inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that 
ceaseth only in death” (11.2).  But in fact Leviathan is not so simple.  To understand the 
line I just quoted, for example, it is necessary to read Hobbes’s account of what power is 
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and about the multiple forms it takes—an account given in the chapter immediately 
preceding the chapter with that famous quotation.  There we see Hobbes saying very little 
about power as power over other humans, but we do see him writing in praise of 
liberality and even friendship (10.4).  It is quite surprising on the whole, given Hobbes’s 
reputation, how rarely, if at all, in Leviathan, we find arguments or assertions that the 
urge to surpass and dominate other humans is normal or typically human.  It is not in 
Leviathan that Hobbes quotes the old saying “Man is wolf to man.”  For that matter, 
when he does quote that in the dedicatory letter to De Cive, Hobbes specifies that nations 
are like wolves to one another but says that within nations and referring to individuals, 
“Man is God to man.” 
 
What, then, about the passions leads us into conflict with each other?  To begin, I should 
note that the initial appearance of three passions being at play in the natural condition is 
misleading.  The second cause, which leads to diffidence and to the greatest amount of 
conflict, does not appear to be a passion at all.  It is not a passion but rather a calculation 
of what others can probably be expected to do, that leads one to distrust them and so to 
take wide-ranging preventative action to stop them from taking what one has acquired 
(13.4).  We are left with two passions, one which leads to competition and one which is 
connected to the human concern for reputation and esteem, which is to say that it appears 
that the two passions in question drive us to try to surpass others and to seek recognition 
of superiority from others.  So despite what I asserted a few moments ago about 
Leviathan in general, in this specific instance it nevertheless appears that the conflict-
causing passions are passions for eminence of various kinds. 
 4 
On examination, however, it turns out that the passions in question are not accurately 
described in that way.  Hobbes does not in fact say that competition results from a desire 
to have more than others or to surpass them in some other way.  Similarly, the passion 
connected with “glory” is not, as Hobbes describes it, a passion that actively seeks 
recognition of one’s superiority; he does not say it is a passion that sends one in quest of 
admiration.   
 
How does conflict begin, then?  The beginning of competition is in a belief each 
individual has about his own mind and his own wisdom.  No one believes there can be 
many as wise as himself, and so each believes in his ability to attain what he desires (and 
he may desire the same thing another desires).  The beginning of competition, in other 
words, is an opinion one has of the qualities of one’s own mind.  And the beginning of 
the conflict with others over one’s reputation is a sign of undervalue that another person 
shows for one or for one’s family, friends, nation, and so on.  At the risk of boiling it 
down too far, when I want another to value me at the rate at which I value myself, I want 
him to have a specific kind of thought identical to a thought I have.  Certainly I can feel 
undervalued by another who has neither taken nor threatened action against me.  I will 
revisit this below, but being undervalued or shown contempt can be an injury felt entirely 
as an assault on one’s thoughts and only on one’s thoughts.  The two causes of conflict 
connected to the passions, competition and glory, begin with what can be called 
particular states of mind, and so it seems quite reasonable to seek an explanation of the 
origins of conflict in Hobbes’s teaching on the working of the mind.  He begins that 
teaching with an account of perception. 
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It makes sense to begin that way since, as Hobbes notes, “there is no conception in a 
man’s mind which hath not at first, totally or by parts, been begotten upon the organs of 
sense” (1.2).  Understanding perception, it turns out, is necessary not only for 
understanding thinking and reasoning, but for understanding the passions and even what 
we might now call “value judgments.”  That is, an appetite or desire can be directed only 
at something already sensed, just as a thought or conception can be only of something 
already sensed.  And what an appetite or desire is for, one calls good, while that from 
which one has an aversion one calls evil or vile (6.7). 
 
The cause of a sensation, Hobbes says, is the actual physical contact of a body on an 
organ “either immediately, as in the taste and touch, or mediately, as in seeing, hearing, 
and smelling” (1.4).  Sense is caused by matter in motion striking other matter, and the 
most basic laws of motion apply to that matter and explain imagination, memory, and 
dreams, which are either decaying or obscured sense—that is, slowing or weakening 
motion—or the product of “the agitation [or movement] of the inward parts of man’s 
body” (2.5).   
 
Hobbes makes clear that because of how we perceive, it is possible to perceive, and 
therefore to think of or conceive, only what is material and finite (3.12).  As he fills out 
the picture of the way perception works and the way that thinking follows perception he 
also shows, to use a term that is not Hobbes’s, that any and all human thought is purely 
“subjective.”  Not only are all of my sensations dependent on my organs, and so, for 
example, I will sense some things more intensely and some less intensely than someone 
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else whose organs function differently, but the train of my thoughts and of what I imagine 
is dependent on my specific experiences.  “We have no transition from one imagination 
to another,” Hobbes says, “if we never had the like before in our senses” (3.2).  That is 
because memories and thoughts work according to the laws of motion.  A sensation is 
accompanied by, follows and is followed by, some sensations and not others in the 
physical sense.  There is no such thing as free association since any particular sense or 
thought is always associated with other specific sensations or thoughts, again, in a 
physical, material sense.  My sensing mechanism may eventually be filled to its physical 
limit—we speak of “sensory overload”—but as long as I continue to experience new 
things, it is not accurate to say that my mind is a closed system.  In all circumstances, 
however, it is a unique system, depending on the functioning of my own organs and on 
my unique set of experiences, and consisting of my particular set of desires, aversions, 
hopes, fears and so on.   
 
As an aside it should be noted that though my thoughts are unique, some degree of 
community can be attained through exchange of speeches—and no community at all 
could be attained without speech, Hobbes says (4.1).  However, “all names [or words] are 
imposed to signify our conceptions” (4.24).  We cannot name things directly or name 
things themselves, and so it follows that it is only by coincidence that words can be 
understood in exactly the same way by any two people.  Those living closely together 
with many similar experiences understand each other better than others.  But we need 
think only of the misunderstandings between spouses and between parents and children, 
 7 
to see how rare perfect understanding is.  And I will revisit below the question of how 
much community Hobbes thinks it is possible to attain. 
 
Let’s return to the causes of quarrel Hobbes identified.  In chapter thirteen he said that 
competition originates in the sense each has that he is wiser than just about everyone else.  
That statement is easily taken to refer to human vanity as a kind of character flaw, but 
Hobbes seems to mean something else.  In chapter forty-four he makes a broader 
statement along the same lines: “no man can conceive there is any greater degree of 
[understanding] than that which he hath already attained to” (44.2).  This statement is 
broader than the similar one in chapter thirteen because it means not merely that one 
thinks no one else is as wise as oneself, it means that at any given time one’s own 
wisdom and understanding seem to oneself perfect or complete.  In fact, the belief in the 
perfection of one’s wisdom comes first and it then follows that insofar as one can see that 
another thinks differently, that other naturally seems to be less wise and so naturally does 
not appear worthy of deference.  Yet this is not vanity as a character flaw because it is a 
physical impossibility to conceive of understanding greater than that which one has 
oneself, just as it is a physical impossibility that a man conceive “in his imagination any 
greater light than he hath at some time or other perceived by his outward senses” (44.2).  
Competition begins, to make the point plain, because of the physical impossibility of 
conceiving of wisdom superior to one’s own, which naturally appears to oneself (but only 
to oneself) complete or perfect wisdom. 
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There may be another way to see this point as well.  Hobbes says that the fact that no one 
believes there can be many as wise as himself shows that all men are equal in their 
faculties of mind because “there is not ordinarily a greater sign of the equal distribution 
of anything than that every man is contented with his share” (13.2).  Hobbes is in a way 
joking here.  But he does seem to resignedly accept the state of affairs in which no one 
recognizes superior wisdom in anyone else, and that suggests that he thinks that nothing 
can be done about it.  Since Hobbes seems to think that something can be done to change 
just about anything and everything, excepting only the laws of motion, if this basic 
characteristic of human minds cannot be changed, it must be because it is due to matter 
moving against other matter.   
 
Turning to the other passion that is a cause of conflict in the nature of man, the passion 
concerned with glory or the degree to which another shows he values me, it seems much 
more difficult to show that natural science and only natural science can explain it, but 
perhaps something like the reasoning about the passion leading to competition applies to 
this passion also. 
 
If we look closely at the explanation Hobbes gives, we can see some connection to the 
state of mind that leads to competition.  Hobbes says, “every man looketh that his 
companion should value him at the same rate he sets upon himself, and upon all signs of 
contempt, or undervaluing, naturally endeavors as far as he dares . . . to extort a greater 
value from his contemners” (13.5).  What signs of contempt, specifically, lead to 
conflict?  Hobbes says they will be “trifles,” such as “a word, a smile, a different 
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opinion” (13.7).  As I noted above, Hobbes does not say we actively seek out glory or 
admiration or recognition of our value, nor do we want it from everyone; it is that no one 
wants to be undervalued by someone close to him, his companion.  But what can this 
possibly have to do with the explanation of perception?   
 
Perhaps a connection can be found in the following way: the signs of contempt Hobbes 
names are not physically threatening.  One of them is a smile.  The other two—a word 
and an opinion—have directly to do with the understanding, with thoughts.  Hobbes does 
not tell us exactly what is so provoking about a word (or a smile) indicating contempt, 
nor does he say specifically why the mere expression of an opinion opposing one of mine 
seems to me to be a sign of undervaluing me.  None of these is a direct or physical threat, 
but experience tells us that the mere expression of an opinion can and often does feel like 
a kind of threat, a threat to the sense I have of the perfection or completeness of the 
wisdom I seem to myself to have, a sense I have due to the physical limits of my mind.  
Hobbes says here that both insulter and insulted might fight to the death, and in real life 
they surely might do just that.  And there is a kind of logic to their doing so.  To accept 
the insult would be to accept a negation or denial of the completeness or perfection of 
one’s understanding and wisdom, the framework of senses and thoughts one lives in 
naturally and as a matter of physical necessity.  Life would seem to be no longer one’s 
own; it would seem intolerable or like no life at all.  The physical workings of our minds 
force on us the logic of fighting when we feel undervalued by another. 
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This explanation of the natural condition as originating in the physical working of the 
mind does not make that condition easier to overcome than it would be if it originated in 
desires to dominate or be pre-eminent.  To the contrary, it is much more difficult to see 
how the condition of war can ever be fully overcome in this case.  We can invoke 
“education,” but in a crucial passage Hobbes suggests that the kinds of fundamental 
insights that are required for breaking out of one’s self-contained “thought shell” come 
only by accident (44.2).  There certainly is evidence that Hobbes did not think the 
condition of war can be overcome even with an all-powerful sovereign.  Most simply, it 
does not appear that even with such a sovereign one will typically come to think there is 
no need to lock one’s doors and safes and so on.  When you believe in the need to do that, 
Hobbes tells us, you think you are in a kind of state of war against whoever you fear 
might rob you, and in his example that includes members of your own family (13.10).  
Nor with an all-powerful sovereign does Hobbes expect any individual to forget himself; 
no individual contracts away his right to try to stay alive, no matter what.  What is more, 
if the all-powerful sovereign were sufficient to bring peace to a commonwealth, there 
would be no need for Hobbes to spell out so many laws of nature in chapters fourteen and 
fifteen of Leviathan.  The summation of those laws is especially revealing: do not do to 
another anything you do not want done to yourself (15.35 and 14.5).  The version of that 
law in the Gospels—do unto others as you would have them do unto you—will lead to 
peace if I can know another’s mind because it is like mine.  Hobbes does not ask anyone 
to try to take into account another’s state of mind.  Rather, his path to peace, like his way 
of proving his doctrine (Introduction.4), requires each to know only his own unique mind 
(see 2.1). 
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1 All references to Leviathan are to the edition edited by Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994).  
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